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In the October 11, 2010 issue of New Yorker Magazine, Ryan Lizza 
sheds light on recent congressional efforts to pass comprehensive energy 
and climate legislation. Senators John Kerry, Lindsey Graham, and Joseph 
Lieberman (respectively, a Democrat, a Republican, and an Independent) 
worked for months to craft a mutually tolerable bill.1 However, under 
the draconian rules of the United States Senate, a controversial bill 
cannot move to a floor vote without the support of at least 60 senators. 
This meant that the bill’s sponsors needed to focus more on the whims 
of a handful of senators in the minority than they did on the majority of 
the members, who would likely support anything acceptable to the 
authors.2 Lizza describes a process under which the bill’s proponents 
sacrificed major provisions in the legislation in the hopes of buying 
support from certain swing senators.3 This process only succeeded in 
weakening the bill without securing additional votes.4 Eventually, the 
whole effort collapsed.5 
Given that a multi-partisan effort to move a bill failed in the last 
Senate, and the grid lock of the Congress that followed, the odds of passing 
comprehensive climate and energy legislation in the are all the more 
dismal. Yet, the underlying problems creating the need for energy 
reform persist. The United States has yet to make a firm commitment to 
long-term greenhouse gas reduction, and its energy policy continues to be 
fragmented and scattered. Meanwhile, China and various European 
nations appear to be taking the lead in producing and selling renewable 
power equipment. 
In this context, perhaps it is time to reconsider the congressional 
approach to energy policy—to find the pieces that have worked and to 
abandon the ones that continue to fail. The greatest failure has been one 
of political will to prescribe a uniform national approach. The more 
promising avenue likely carves a path of cooperative federalism. Such 
an approach would leave to the states the primary responsibility for 
developing and executing a particular program, while imposing significant 
requirements to be followed in the discharge of that responsibility. 
It is in the states that hope remains for action consistent with our 
environmental challenges. Congress has a critical role to play in bringing 
out the best that each state has to offer. This paper considers the 
opportunity to apply proven approaches for sharing responsibility with 
the states to one of the critical components of a new energy policy—
 1. Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, http://www. 
newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/101011fa_fact_lizza. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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using renewable electric generation in lieu of power plants fired by coal, 
oil, or natural gas. This policy is most often expressed in the form of a 
“renewable portfolio standard” or a “renewable energy standard” imposed 
on the utilities and other entities providing electric power service. 
I.  WHY RENEWABLE POWER IS SO IMPORTANT 
Renewable power6 does not answer all of our climate concerns, but it 
is a critical component of any ambitious effort to reduce electric power-
related greenhouse gas emissions. Assume an interest in reducing such 
emissions to 80 percent below current levels. One way to reach that number 
would be to cut emissions by as much as 50 percent through efficiency 
improvements, take half of the emissions out of the fuel mix through 
fuel substitution, and achieve additional reductions through behavioral 
change. If there is less fuel substitution, then efficiency and behavioral 
gains must be greater. If we remain more inefficient, there must be even 
more fuel substitution. 
There is great potential for efficiency gains in all sectors.7 The 
conversion time will be quite lengthy, and the upfront cost for even 
extremely cost-effective substitutions will be high.8 In addition, while 
efficiency gains remain the most important option, energy demand will 
continue to be considerable.9 Fuel substitution must play a significant 
role. The transportation sector offers the greatest challenge for fuel 
substitution. Current ethanol programs only displace a small fraction of 
liquid fossil fuel use and produce little or no net greenhouse gas 
reduction.10 A dramatic shift in transportation fuel use may require 
substituting electricity for gasoline, which will likely increase the demand 
for electric power. This makes fuel substitution in the power sector all 
the more crucial. 
Half of the power generated in the United States is derived from the 
use of coal—the single greatest source of stationary greenhouse gas 
 6. For the purposes of this discussion renewable power is generated with solar heat, 
photovoltaics, wind, geothermal heat, small hydroelectric facilities, biomass, biofuels, or 
offshore kinetic energy. 
 7. HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 9 (2009). 
 8. Id. at viii. 
 9. Id. at 48. 
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emissions.11 Burning domestic natural gas produces about half the 
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from burning coal.12 Assuming that 
these overly-simplistic numbers apply to all electric generation, replacing 
all of the power generated at coal plants with power generated at natural 
gas plants would reduce power-related greenhouse gas emissions by 25 
percent, which is simply not enough to get the job done.13 But the large-
scale conversion to electric vehicles would increase the demand for 
electricity. Meeting this new demand by burning natural gas would reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in the transportation sector, but increase 
emissions from electric generation. 
These results leave us with two choices to accomplish our goal of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions: capture and store the carbon dioxide 
otherwise released through combustion, or increase our reliance on 
power generation that is not dependent on fossil fuel consumption—
even when that fossil fuel is cleaner-burning natural gas. Carbon capture 
and sequestration is no panacea. It is energy-intensive and requires large 
supplies of water.14 Infrastructure needs are great, and carbon sequestration 
will do nothing to alleviate the environmental devastation related to coal 
mining and processing. Many point to increased reliance on nuclear 
power as at least part of the answer, since greenhouse gas emissions related 
to nuclear fuel processing and power generation are relatively small. 
Yet, the promised nuclear renaissance remains more a reflection of 
engineering optimism than commercial reality. Proponents have always 
said that nuclear power could be safe, fast, and economical. Nonetheless, 
radioactive waste storage challenges remain unresolved; the lead-time 
for planning, permitting, and constructing new plants remains long; and 
costs remain high.15 
 11. Dep’t. of Energy, Fossil Energy: A Brief Overview of Coal, http://fossil.energy. 
gov/education/energylessons/coal/gen_coal.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). 
 12. Using imported natural gas results in greater greenhouse gas emissions, but 
that is a discussion for another time. 
 13. Michael Graham Richard, Some U.S. Utilities Starting to Replace Coal with 
Natural Gas, TREEHUGGER, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.treehugger.com/files/2010/12/ 
utilities-replacing-coal-power-plants-with-natural-gas.php. 
 14. Fossil Energy Office of Commc’ns, Carbon Capture Research, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://www.http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/ 
capture/index.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2011). 
 15. The recent nuclear power crisis at Fukushima Daichi in Japan will, at a minimum, 
add to the uncertainty related to additional nuclear power development in the United States as 
stakeholders debate the significance of the cooling system failures at those plants. In 
addition, the potential role in the Fukushima accident of on-site spent fuel storage will likely 
lead to greater scrutiny of such storage strategies at nuclear power plants throughout the 
world. This adds a new element of uncertainty to both new plant licensing and the 
relicensing of existing plants. See Zulima Palacio, After Fukushima, Nations Put Nuke 




WEISSMAN - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2016  12:41 PM 
[VOL. 3:  345, 2011–12]   Effective Renewable Energy Policy 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
While many of these observations could apply to various renewable 
energy options as well, there have been great and consistent gains in the 
efficiency of wind turbines, the cost of solar photovoltaics, and financial 
support for the build-out of large central-station solar installations. A 
very significant challenge relates to the successful management of 
intermittent generation from solar and wind facilities when that power is 
introduced to the grid. In the short-term, versatile gas-fired peaking 
plants can contribute to system stability. In the long-term, energy storage 
systems of various kinds16 must take on a major role as part of utility 
infrastructure. 
Nonetheless, the conclusion is inevitable: no single energy option will 
break our reliance on coal, oil, and gas. We need to become as efficient 
as practicable in all aspects of energy usage and pursue all promising 
ways of displacing the remaining demand for fossil fuels. On the supply 
side, renewable sources deserve the greatest emphasis due to largely 
inexhaustible fuel supplies and stable operating costs, as well as 
opportunities to minimize conventional pollutants, enhance safety, and 
reduce the burden on future generations in the form of stored carbon 
dioxide and high-level nuclear waste. 
II.  WHERE RENEWABLE GENERATION USE CURRENTLY                             
STANDS IN THE STATES 
Policies supporting the use of renewable sources for electric generation 
are promising in some states, but uneven nationally. Twenty-nine states 
and the District of Columbia have adopted some type of mandate related 
to utility reliance on renewable generation.17 Although precise names 
may differ, these can be referred to generally as Renewable Portfolio 
Standards. Some states’ standards are much more ambitious than others. 
For instance, while California law calls for achieving 33 percent renewable 
power by the year 2020, its neighbor, Arizona, seeks 15 percent by 
-On-Hold-119361329.html; Prachi Patel, Fukushima’s Impact on Nuclear Power, IEEE 
SPECTRUM: TECH TALK (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www. spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/energy/ 
nuclear/fukushimas-impact-on-nuclear-power. 
 16. Promising technologies include advanced batteries, compressed air, hydroelectric 
pumped storage, ice, and other forms of storing the benefits of electric generation for 
later use. See BRAD ROBERTS & JESSICA HARRISON, ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., ENERGY 
STORAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES ELECTRICITY GRID 2-3 (2011). 
 17. Renewable Power & Energy Efficiency Market: Renewable Portfolio Standard, 
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM., http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/othr-mkts/renew/ 
othr-rnw-rps.pdf (last updated Aug. 11, 2011). 
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2025.18 Minnesota requires 25 percent renewable power by 2025, while 
Wisconsin only requires 10 percent by 2015.19 In addition, states define 
qualifying renewable generation in inconsistent ways—some states allow 
municipal waste incinerators to qualify, some count generation from 
existing large-scale hydroelectric dams, and some allow energy 
efficiency improvements to qualify.20 
What is perhaps most noteworthy is that a significant number of states 
with either no renewable portfolio standard or with weak requirements 
are places with above-average reliance on coal-fired power.21 It is in 
those states where the substitution of renewable power for conventional 
generation could have the greatest impact on greenhouse gas reductions. 
Consider Pennsylvania, one of the four most coal-dependent states in the 
nation. While its standard calls for 18 percent reliance on alternatives by 
2020, only 8 percent must come from wind, solar, small hydropower, 
geothermal, or biomass (and this portion can include coalmine methane).22 
The remaining 10 percent could come from waste coal, demand side 
management, large hydropower, municipal solid waste, or coal integrated 
gasification combined cycle.23 None of these options is considered 
“renewable” for the purposes of programs in the more ambitious states. 
Indiana, one of the ten most coal-dependent states, has no renewable 
portfolio standard requirement at all.24 The top tier of coal-dependent 
states includes Georgia, who spends the most on coal imports and has no 
standard in place, North Carolina, who has a low 12.5% standard, Texas, 
and Florida, who has no statute in place as well.25 
In sum, 21 states (including many of those that are most dependent on 
coal power) impose no firm requirements for their electric utilities to 
incorporate renewable power, while many other states impose standards 
that may fail to produce much renewable power. 
 18. RYAN WISER ET AL., SUPPORTING SOLAR POWER IN RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO 
STANDARDS: EXPERIENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES 5 (2010), available at http://eetd.lbl. 
gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-3984e.pdf. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, PEW CENTER ON 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 1-5, 7 http://www.pewclimate.org/sites/default/modules/usmap/ 
pdf.php?file=5907 (last updated Aug. 25, 2011). 
 21. See JEFF DEYETTE & BARBARA FREESE, BURNING COAL, BURNING CASH 2 
(Union of Concerned Scientists 2010). 
 22. See id. at 3; Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, supra note 
20, at 7. 
 23. Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, supra note 20, at 7. 
 24. See Deyette & Freese, supra note 21, at 8; Renewable & Alternative Energy 
Portfolio Standards, supra note 20, at 3. 
 25. Deyette & Freese, supra note 21, at 8; Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio 
Standards, supra note 20, at 2, 6, 8. 
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III.  THE APPEAL OF A FEDERAL RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD 
A federal renewable energy standard would not stand alone among 
federal renewable power initiatives, as there are various tax credits, loan 
guarantees, and research and development programs already in place. 
However, while existing federal programs are designed to promote market 
growth and technological breakthroughs, a procurement standard for the 
nation’s utilities would ensure substantial and growing demand. In addition, 
with such a standard in place, all of the nation’s electric utilities would 
be required to plan for and to incorporate a particular amount of 
renewable power. 
A federal standard would offer some degree of consistency from state 
to state and create mandates where there are none. It could facilitate the 
sale of renewable power among the states by setting uniform rules of 
trade and would manifest a national commitment to developing and 
maintaining broader markets for renewable generation and its attendant 
technologies. The short-term result could be an increase in investor 
confidence. In the long-term, proponents hope to see a significant 
increase in green sector employment and the refinement of other federal 
policies to be consistent with the mandate. Since there is no equivalent 
oil or coal mandate, a long-term commitment to renewable power 
development should cause policy makers to question the wisdom of 
continuing to subsidize fossil fuels while at the same time trying to 
displace their use with renewable alternatives. 
IV.  WHY THE NATION CANNOT RELY ON CONGRESS TO CREATE A 
STRONG STANDARD 
Since 2001, Congress has failed repeatedly in its efforts to create a 
national renewable energy standard.26 Provisions to that effect have 
passed the House and the Senate, but never both in the same bill.27 These 
provisions have failed when Republicans controlled both houses, when 
Democrats controlled both houses, and when each party dominated one 
 26. See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It 
Wrong: The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for 
Policy, 3 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 86-89, 148 (2008). 
 27. Bryan Walsh, Can Congress Pass a Renewable Energy Standard?, TIME 
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chamber. They have failed when incorporated as part of comprehensive 
energy legislation and when they stood alone. 
Equally as discouraging, the renewable energy standards proposed in 
recent bills have been less than inspirational, no doubt reflecting a desire 
on the part of the bills’ authors to overcome persistent opposition. A 
close examination of one of the most recent examples—S.3813, a bill 
introduced in late 2010 but not passed—is instructive. While California 
aimed for 20 percent renewable electricity by 2010 and 33 percent by 
2020, this bill promised 15 percent by 2020.28 It also offered numerous 
ways for a utility to avoid ever needing to achieve 15 percent of its 
demand with renewable energy. Here are some of the ways: 
The first way out comes in the answer to the question: 15 percent of 
what?  While California serves as an example, there are similar provisions 
in many other states.  California requires 33 percent of demand to be met 
with renewable sources. Period. Before calculating its 15 percent amount, 
S.3813 would have allowed the utility to subtract from its total demand 
the output of any hydroelectric plant serving its customers, the output of 
any new nuclear plant, the incremental output from any existing nuclear 
plant, the output of any coal plant employing carbon sequestration, and 
the output of any pumped storage facility29 (regardless of how 
nonrenewable the source of power pumping that water might be).30 The 
federal standard would have been further diluted by the inclusion of 
domestic trash as renewable fuel.31 In most states with their own renewable 
standards, garbage, if it is allowed at all, must first be converted to a 
clean-burning gas. The federal legislation imposed no such requirement. 
Another path of avoidance came from the fact that, under the bill, all 
renewable sources were not created equal. The way a utility would have 
shown compliance with the standard was by submitting credit 
certificates for all of the renewable power it generated or purchased and 
for all of the credits the utility might have bought from other renewable 
energy producers, even for power from sources that would never have 
delivered power to the utility’s customers.32 If a utility served a billion 
kilowatt hours of electricity in 2020 (and had not reduced its renewable 
energy obligations in other ways), it would have needed to submit 
certificates equal to 150 million kilowatt hours. But the amount of 
 28. S. 3813, 111th Cong. § 610 (2010). 
 29. A pumped storage facility relies on off-peak electric generation to pump water 
from a lower-elevation reservoir to one at a higher elevation. At times when electric 
demand is higher, the operator can release the stored water to spin a turbine and generate 
electricity as the water makes its way downhill. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. 
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renewable power generated might have been quite a bit less. That is 
because renewable power would earn double credits if it came from 
Indian land, triple credits if it came from generators smaller than one 
megawatt, and triple credits if it involved algae.33 And some biomass 
generators could have produced up to 1.5 credits per kilowatt-hour if 
they were especially efficient.34 It is not possible to predict how much 
renewable power would actually have been generated under this plan, 
but it might have been quite a bit less than 15 percent of the power sold 
to the utility’s customers. 
There is more, however. Utility compliance could also have come 
from the results of energy efficiency programs, or from the efficiency 
gains resulting from combined heat and power projects.35 Those are 
power plants that use waste steam from some industrial or commercial 
project to generate electricity—a process that can save a lot of fuel; but 
that fuel might be natural gas, oil, or even coal. 
All of the measures that would have provided extra credits, reduced 
demand, or promoted efficiency are good things. The problem was that 
they were all mixed together in the bill with the renewable energy goals. 
In the end, it was impossible to predict the amount of renewable power 
that would have resulted from the proposed federal standard. It is very 
safe to say that in many places, renewable power produced to comply 
with this federal law would have been much less than 15 percent by 
2020. All this, while California and many other states aim higher in 
terms of renewable energy use over time and employ compliance 
formulae that are comparatively pure and simple.36 It should be noted 
that another senator responded to S.3813 by proposing a substitute bill 
that would have allowed credit for power from new nuclear plants and 
new coal plants incorporating at least 60 percent carbon sequestration, as 
well as other non-renewable sources.37 While the initial bill would have 
subtracted the output of such resources from the denominator in 
calculating the 15 percent compliance, the substitute bill would have 
added that output to the numerator—making it a much more effective 
way to avoid using more renewable power. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Supra note 18, at 3-9. 
 37. S. 20, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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In his  State of the Union Address in both 2011 and 2012, President 
Obama appears to have picked up where the substitute bill left off: by 
proposing a goal of relying on clean energy sources for 80 percent of the 
electric power to be generated in 2035. This proposal would include 
nuclear power, natural gas plants, and some coal-fired plants within the 
definition of clean fuel. Since it would allow only partial credit for gas 
and coal-fired power, the clean energy proposal would likely lead to an 
increase in renewable generation in at least some states.38 However, 
history suggests that if Congress were ultimately to adopt a standard, it 
would be significantly lower than the 80 percent proposed by the 
President. How this proposal would affect renewable power deployment 
in any particular state, and whether the goals would be enforceable, are 
unknown. What seems evident is that states would have creative options 
for coming into compliance using non-renewable resources. It is also 
conceivable that this new proposal will silence or overwhelm efforts to 
develop a renewable, energy-specific national standard. 
These proposals raise a fundamental question: Is any kind of federal 
standard better than none? There is no easy answer. At first glance, it 
seems that most of the federal standards proposed so far would not have 
preempted more ambitious state standards, which is good. Yet, it is in 
the crafting of rules implementing the law that we would find out 
whether the federal program would undercut efforts in the states. The 
most recent federal bill recognized a number of important options worthy of 
promotion, including energy efficiency and combined heat and power.39 
However, by lumping them together with renewable sources, the bill 
fails to recognize that each pathway is important on its own. As part of 
an effort to cut greenhouse gas emissions far below current levels, we 
need to make power use as efficient as possible and build out renewable 
generating capacity and rely on combined heat and power. We cannot 
take a little from here and there and hope to make a meaningful dent in 
greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, a 15 percent target is too low—
especially considering all of the carve-outs the bill would allow for 
nuclear power, coal power, and other non-renewable sources. Even with 
deference to higher state standards, a weak federal program could put 
pressure on the states to lower their expectations. 
 38. In an online town hall meeting the day after the 2011 speech, Energy Secretary 
Steven Chu said that the definition of clean fuels needs to be “fleshed out” with Congress. 
Therefore, the nature of the proposal remains unclear (http://energy.gov/ videos/sec-chu-
online-town-hall).  The White House claims that the nation already relies on clean energy for 
40 percent of its electric power.  Since the role of renewable power is currently much 
smaller than that, the Administration’s definition of clean power must include existing 
resources such as large-scale hydroelectric, nuclear power, and natural gas generation. 
 39. S. 3813, 111th Cong. § 610 (2010). 
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Many environmental and renewable energy industry groups supported 
S.3813; although, perhaps not with great enthusiasm.40 With the bill’s 
passage, the United States would have had its first national renewable 
energy mandate to apply to non-governmental entities. It would have led 
to a uniform system for tracking renewable energy credits and provided 
some hope for later amendments, leading to a more meaningful standard. 
Yet, even if an adopted federal standard were later improved, efforts in 
the interim might have been misdirected. In addition, once an industry 
sector won a concession—such as coal technologies being treated as if 
they were renewable and others being allowed to receive multiple credits 
per unit of production—how easy would it be to reverse that concession? 
V.  WHY THE NATION AND THE WORLD CANNOT RELY ON                               
THE STATES, ACTING ALONE 
When it comes to local renewable energy resources, not all states are 
created equal. The Western states are blessed with a rich bouquet of 
renewable power options, with abundant desert sun, promising geothermal 
sites, and plentiful wind both on and off shore. The upper Midwest is 
famous for its stiff winds. Eastern states have high potential for power 
generated from biomass. Yet, the leaders in many states are left worrying 
that the lack of local renewable resources could place them at an 
economic disadvantage in the face of renewable power mandates. This is 
the concern, despite studies that suggest that every state could meet at 
least 20 percent, and most states could meet far in excess of a quarter of 
their power needs with just homegrown wind and rooftop photovoltaic 
resources.41 Considering this concern and the fact that many states rely 
on coal power and the coal industry, it is not surprising that some states 
are reluctant to commit to ambitious renewable energy goals without 
pressure from the rest of the nation. 
Even if states were uniformly motivated to develop renewable power, 
there are at least two aspects of renewable energy mandates that could 
benefit from federal involvement. Those are the renewable energy credit 
 40. Clients Lobbying on S.3813, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ 
billsum.php?id=119256&lname=S.3813 (last visited Sept. 06, 2011). 
 41. See, e.g., John Farrell & David Morris, Energy Self-Reliant States Second and 
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process and the development of rules within a given state that might 
interfere with interstate commerce. 
Renewable Energy Credits (often referred to as “RECs”) are the vehicle 
through which utilities demonstrate compliance with renewable power 
mandates. The staff of the California Public Utilities Commission 
defines RECs as follows: 
A REC confers to its holder a claim on the renewable attributes of one unit of 
energy generated from a renewable resource. RECs are “created” by a 
renewable generator simultaneous to the production of electricity and can 
subsequently be sold separately from the underlying energy. This gives rise to 
two scenarios: one in which a renewable generator sells [its] energy and the 
credit bundled together, and another, in which the energy is sold to one buyer 
and the renewable credit is unbundled and sold to another. In the case of the 
former, the buyer receives both the energy and the credit, while, in the latter, 
one buyer receives the energy, which has been “stripped” of its renewable 
attributes, while another buyer purchases the renewable credit.  
In the context of the [Renewable Portfolio Standard], the ability to separate the 
energy from the renewable attributes gives [utilities and other] load-serving 
entities with limited access to renewable energy resources the ability to 
purchase RECs to be applied toward their renewable energy obligations from 
renewable generators, irrespective of where those generators are located or 
where the energy itself is ultimately delivered. This allows [those load-serving 
entities] to avoid the costs associated with accommodating physical delivery of 
the underlying energy and/or the costs associated with remarketing the energy if 
delivery is not an option. By removing these transaction costs, obligated entities 
are given greater flexibility in terms of how and what resources they rely on to 
achieve their [renewable power] goals, thereby reducing their costs of 
compliance.42 
If regulators allow utilities to demonstrate compliance with the 
submission of unbundled credits, the integrity of the program depends 
on those credits being real (reflecting power actually generated and 
delivered to a grid somewhere), verifiable, and counted only once. In order 
to ensure that the credits have these qualities, states allowing for the use 
of tradable credits have established electronic certificate tracking systems. 
There are several such systems in operation in different parts of the 
country. Although there are voluntary efforts to coordinate data collection 
and use among the various systems, each operates under its own rules. A 
single, centrally-managed national credit tracking system would help to 
ensure that credits traded across state and regional lines were of consistently 
high quality. 
In addition, as states develop and modify their programs in an effort to 
maximize renewable energy deployment and stimulate local economic 
 42. ANDREW SCHWARTZ, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
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development, it is likely that they will be encumbered by federal 
constitutional limits, stemming from the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
when trying to design the most successful program. The Dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine derives from the negative implications of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause that gives Congress the power “to regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.”43 As interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Congress’ sole authority in this arena implies that states 
are forbidden from passing legislation that improperly burdens or 
discriminates against interstate commerce by providing differential 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests.44 
Some have argued that if an individual state imposed an in-state 
preference or mandate for renewable energy facilities in its Renewable 
Portfolio Standard or established renewable energy credit rules that 
might create disadvantages for out-of-state generators, the state’s actions 
would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.45 
Long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that Congress can 
authorize state regulations that, without such Congressional action, 
would otherwise violate Dormant Commerce Clause principles.46 The 
right kind of federal action to protect states from Dormant Commerce 
Clause claims related to renewable energy standards could help states in 
their efforts to develop more effective programs and potentially encourage 
states that have thus far not developed renewable energy mandates to do 
so. 
VI.  WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE PUBLIC UTILITY                
REGULATORY POLICY ACT OF 1978 
In 1978, when Congress first took steps to encourage utility-based 
renewable energy development, it did not choose to mandate a uniform 
quantity of development across the nation. Instead, in the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policy Act (“PURPA”), Congress directed each state to 
establish a program under which its regulated utilities would be required 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 44. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
 45. Elizabeth Catlin, Commerce Clause Challenge to Renewable Portfolio Standards, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY L. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2010), http://renewableenergylaw.blogspot.com/ 
2010/04/commerce-clause-challenge-to-renewable.html. 
 46. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 321 (1852); In re Rahrer, 
140 U.S. 545, 561–62 (1891). 
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to purchase power produced at certain qualifying facilities47 and to pay 
those facilities for the power they produced at the utility’s avoided cost 
(the amount the utility would have paid to purchase the same amount of 
power elsewhere). Each state could administer its own program and was 
empowered to determine its utilities’ avoided cost. At its peak, this 
program was credited with resulting in 12,000 megawatts of installed 
renewable energy capacity in the United States.48 Some states were 
much more successful in attracting participants than others; California 
led the way, with 6,100 megawatts of installed capacity.49 Although the 
program is now past its peak, the Pacific Gas & Electric Company 
reports that a quarter of its current power supply comes from qualifying 
facilities.50 Southern California Edison (second in size only to Pacific 
Gas & Electric) reports that a third of its power comes from qualifying 
facilities.51 
PURPA changed expectations about the sources of electric power. It 
opened electric markets to non-utility generators—a process that was 
taken to a new level with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.52 
That law created a class of providers called “merchant generators,” 
which could include power generated with any type of fuel and would be 
assured non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid.53 Together, 
these acts changed the electric power landscape without forcing any state 
to meet predetermined quotas.54 
These two acts enjoyed broad support in Congress. PURPA passed in 
the Senate 76-1355 and in the House of Representatives 231-168.56 The 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 passed 381-37 in the House57 and 93-3 in the 
Senate.58 In comparison, efforts to impose specific renewable energy 
requirements on the states have received split votes and have never 
passed in both bodies of Congress. 
 47. Cogenerators, as well as small renewable energy power facilities (no larger than 80 
megawatts). 
 48. MIGUEL MENDOCA, FEED-IN TARIFFS: ACCELERATING THE DEPLOYMENT OF 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 61 (2007). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Qualifying Facilities, PAC. GAS & ELECTRIC, http://www.pge.com/b2b/energy 
supply/qualifyingfacilities/facilities/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). 
 51. Qualifying Facilities Background, S. CAL. EDISON, http://www.sce.com/About 
SCE/Regulatory/qualifyingfacilities/qfbackground.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). 
 52. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 271–
74 (2004). 
 53. Id. at 275–76. 
 54. Id. at 271–76. 
 55. 124. CONG. REC. 34780 (1978). 
 56. 124 CONG. REC. 38503 (1978). 
 57. 138 CONG. REC. 12725–26 (1992). 
 58. 138 CONG. REC. 20430 (1992). 
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While there are many factors at play in a complex bill, it appears that 
legislators from some states will strongly resist an approach that prescribes 
specific fuel mix obligations.59 Programs that reflect a national standard 
while allowing for considerable local flexibility seem to have a better 
chance of success. 
VII.  A FORMULA FOR MAXIMIZING RENEWABLE POWER 
DEVELOPMENT 
The nation must rely on states to promote renewable power because 
our system of laws leaves to the states many of the fundamental aspects 
of electric generation planning, construction, and procurement. If the 
federal government wants to speed the deployment of renewable resources, 
it must require or otherwise motivate the individual states to take strong 
action. There is little debate that to accomplish this, Congress must 
accept certain political realities, including the disparate impact that 
renewable energy development may have on the various states, the 
interest in many states to continue promoting the use of coal and natural 
gas, and Congress’ proven inability to enact an effective standard. 
However, what Congress might be able to accomplish may also be the 
best approach overall. Here are the elements of one approach that draws 
on the most promising elements of cooperative federalism: 
A.  No Federal Standard 
Congress could choose not to adopt a single, national, renewable 
energy standard. History suggests that any such standard would be weak 
and full of loopholes. 
B.  Require a State Standard 
Short of establishing a national standard, Congress could insist that 
each state develop its own.  The federal government could set a deadline 
for compliance and develop criteria for the state’s decision.  Absent 
timely state action, the federal government could impose a standard on 
the state. 
 59. Robin Bravender, Lawmakers in 17 states step up opposition to EPA’s GHG 
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C.  Encourage Ambitious State Programs 
Congress could offer various incentives for states to adopt and 
implement more aggressive programs. For instance, Congress could 
direct the Department of Energy to distribute renewable energy research 
and development funds to the states based on the comparative goals, 
timetables, and successful implementation of state renewable energy 
standards. The law could allow the appropriate federal agency to grant a 
Dormant Commerce Clause exemption to states with programs surpassing 
certain standards. This would enable states with ambitious renewable 
energy programs to design them in a manner intended to stimulate local 
economic development and keep more energy dollars within the state. 
D.  Establish a National Renewable Energy Credit Program 
Because of its broad authority related to interstate commerce, the 
federal government is in the position best suited to create a unified 
national system for tracking and trading renewable energy credits. With 
a single national system ensuring that the renewable power underlying 
the credits is real, delivered to the grid, and not counted more than once, 
it would be easier to facilitate trades among the states and to ensure 
accurate counting. Consistent credit definitions and trading rules are an 
important way to ensure that the credit transactions in one state are not 
diluting program effectiveness in another. For instance, if one state does 
not count large-scale hydroelectric power as renewable for the purposes 
of its program, a national credit program should ensure that a utility in a 
second state cannot buy credits stemming from those hydroelectric 
plants. Even with a national system, individual states should have the 
ability to determine whether renewable energy credits can be used to 
achieve program compliance and, if so, how. 
E.  Allow Feed-in Tariffs 
Several states have considered the adoption of feed-in tariffs, which 
would require utilities to purchase power from certain renewable energy 
facilities at predetermined prices. Some envision that by setting those 
prices at levels sufficient to make renewable generation profitable, its 
development would soar. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
which regulates wholesale electric prices in interstate commerce and 
oversees the implementation of the qualifying facilities program under 
PURPA, has concluded that its authority in these areas preempts a state’s 
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ability to invoke feed-in tariffs.60 To free the states to use any reasonable 
tool to promote renewable energy development, recent failed legislation 
has included language to permit state-initiated feed-in tariffs. New 
legislation to promote renewable power could include such language as 
well. 
F.  Require Separate Energy Efficiency Goals 
Energy efficiency improvements and renewable power are not either-
or choices—we need to pursue both. In addition to requiring states to set 
a renewable energy standard, Congress could require states to set goals 
and establish programs to make energy use more efficient. This could 
include an aggressive effort aimed at rental buildings, since there is often 
a split incentive between a building owner hesitant to invest in efficiency 
improvements and a tenant forced to pay high utility bills that makes it 
difficult to improve energy use in these structures. Because of a utility’s 
inherent interest in promoting greater sales, Congress could require 
states to consider third-party management of ratepayer-funded efficiency 
programs. 
G.  Stabilize Tax Incentives 
Congress has approved various investment and production tax credits 
for renewable energy development and has always authorized them for 
only a few years at a time.61 Critics have amply documented the 
resulting on-and-off nature of project development. Congress could offer 
greater long-term investment certainty by renewing the credits indefinitely 
or, alternatively, setting clear criteria for phasing them out over time. 
H.  Require Integrated Resource Planning 
Many options for responding to forecasted demand for electricity are 
interchangeable. Utilities can satisfy demand by helping make energy 
use more efficient, adjusting rates to shift demand to a better time of 
day, adding transmission lines, or generating more power.  To generate 
electricity, there are many fuel choices—renewable and otherwise. 
 60. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (July 15, 2010). 
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Nonetheless, most regulators and utilities consider these various options 
in isolation from one another. This way, only the very lucky will end up 
choosing the options that are the most efficient or the best for the 
environment. Regulators can insist that the utilities take an integrated 
approach to planning facilities and services, but most often they do not. 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission acknowledges the importance 
of this state-level function but is not empowered to require it.62 Federal 
law could establish planning standards and require that states implement 
them. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The federal system employed in the United States offers many models 
for cooperation between the federal government and the states in pursuit 
of important policy objectives. Under the Clean Air Act, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency can establish air quality standards and 
delegate enforcement to the states.63 The Coastal Zone Management Act 
empowers states to establish plans for management of ocean waters 
close to shore and to have a say related to offshore projects that are in 
federal jurisdictional waters.64 The Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 allows coal states to set and enforce their own 
rules related to mountaintop mining.65 The Public Utilities Regulatory 
Policy Act of 1978 sets some standards that the states must enforce or 
risk federal intervention.66 It also requires states to consider, but not 
necessarily adopt, various energy policy options related to rate-setting 
and program offerings. 
The political realities related to renewable energy policy suggest that 
Congress will continue to fail in its effort to create a top-down, 
prescribed set of goals for states to implement or will enact a law that is 
weak or potentially counterproductive. A more promising approach may 
be to insist that states adopt and implement programs that increase the 
use of renewable electric generation and then offer incentives for the 
states to make those programs as ambitious and effective as possible. 
 
 62. See 18 C.F.R. pt. 35, 37 (2007); 131 FERC ¶ 61,253 at pt. 39 (June 17, 2010). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1977). 
 64. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (1996). 
 65. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1234-1328 (1977). 
 66. Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1978). 
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